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Secure Rights and Non-Credibility: the Paradoxical Dynamics of 
Canal Irrigation in India 
 
 
 
This paper contributes to the special issue on institutional Form versus Function 
by looking at the opposite side of the conceptual equation: clear and formal 
property rights coupled to low credibility. Since colonial times the formal 
property rights of the means of agricultural production are clear in South Asian 
large-scale canal irrigation. However, legal entitlements to water are routinely 
violated, while canal irrigation exhibits a series of „performance problems‟. 
Legally clearly and securely defined entitlements to water co-exist with unequal 
distribution in the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system in south India. 
Neither the formal institutions, nor their insecurity or lack of clarity can explain 
the existing dynamics and functions of canal irrigation. This lack of analytical 
purchase derives from both the limitations of property focused theory, and from 
the inherent characteristics of canal irrigation. Critiques of reductionist 
approaches have provided a richer conceptual vocabulary, which emphasises the 
plurality of rights/entitlements as well as that of the causalities at work. Such 
critiques and the elaboration of alternative frameworks for analysis remain 
relevant as discourses and practices of „marketisation‟ of water may be gaining 
relevance for canal irrigation (reform) in India. 
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1. Introduction 
 
British colonial intervention in natural resources management in India can be described 
as a combination of a long-drawn act of appropriation by dispossession and an extended 
process of creation of new state and private property rights. For forests, the 
establishment of the colonial, and independent, state‟s property claims over feudal 
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forest estates and the commons is key; for land the creation of private property through 
the so called „land settlements‟ is the central feature in the colonial period. After 
India‟s independence, the privatisation of land was consolidated and further extended. 
Private property rights in land were introduced in the formerly indirectly ruled parts of 
the subcontinent, and confirmed in the formerly directly ruled areas, where these had 
already been established. The land reform process through which this took place was 
also partially a redistributive reform, involving some dispossession of „landlords‟ and 
redistribution of some of that land to small farmers, tenants and the landless. 
While for both forest and land voluminous and rich literatures exist that describe, 
analyse and assess these changes and reforms (Gadgil and Guha 1992; Aziz and Krishna 
1997; Robb 1983), property rights in water have received much less scholarly attention. 
This is partly due to the fact that water was less the subject of (direct) appropriation and 
redistribution by the colonial and independent Indian state than forest and land, and 
therefore less contested. Water appropriation/redistribution remains implicit in land 
appropriation/redistribution when water rights and access to water are inextricably 
linked and subordinate to land rights and access to land. This has been predominantly 
the case in India, at least in state laws, rules and policy frameworks, which construct 
land rather than water as the primary resource. Land‟s constructed primacy expresses 
for instance in the legal arrangement that landowners can freely extract the groundwater 
under their land, in land ownership (and sometimes tenancy) being a condition for 
membership of a water users association in government created canal irrigation, and 
irrigation water fees being levied acre-wise and often collected together with land 
revenue. There is thus an (implicit) assumption in both colonial and independent state 
rule that water is not a property object in the same way and with the same status as land. 
A material condition of possibility for this absence of a „water 
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rights‟ discourse as regards agricultural water use, was that surface water was on 
average, in between the scarcities of droughts and the excesses of floods, seemingly 
abundant, and could be diverted apparently without competing with other uses.1 
This situation is changing. In the 21st century basins are closing and aquifers 
suffer over-extraction, while the ecological uses of water are at least acknowledged.2 
Water scarcity discourses gain force as a result, with, in mainstream economic 
perspectives, calls attached for valuing water at its „true‟ price, for the introduction of 
water markets, and with implicit or explicit arguments for individual property rights in 
water. In groundwater use for irrigation water markets have emerged, notably as part of 
the tubewell boom that started from the 1970s (Shah 2009, 37: Figure 2.1). 
Groundwater markets have been promoted as an instrument for poverty alleviation 
(Shah and Raju 1988) a position that has been strongly contested (Dubash 2002; 
Prakash 2005; Janakarajan and Moench 2006). In surface water use for irrigation, the 
focus of this paper, ideas on water markets and individual property rights in water have 
made much less advance, practically as well as discursively, but also in this respect 
times may be changing. Given the force of (neo)liberalisation, it seems plausible that 
advocacy for policy to move further into the „marketisation‟ direction will gain in 
strength. Consideration of the property object status of water is thus not only relevant 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In colonial times there was little focus on groundwater in state policy and the reference is 
therefore to the „harnessing‟ of surface water for that period. It is relevant to note that in 
India more than 90% of diverted surface water and extracted groundwater is used for 
agricultural purposes, i.e. irrigation (data available at the FAOSTAT website of the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation). 
2  For example through the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules 2010 passed under 
the Environment Protection Act, 1986. 
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for the intellectual purposes of this special issue, but also for practical Indian policy 
reasons. 
As suggested above, no private property rights in surface water for canal 
irrigation exist in India in a way comparable with land as private property. However, 
there are, as will be shown, clearly defined legal entitlements to water for individual 
canal irrigators. These are not generally talked about as „rights‟, but they have been 
treated as such by individual irrigators in certain circumstances and periods. 
Despite the clear and legal status of these entitlements they have, at present, little 
practical relevance for actually existing canal water distribution. Canal irrigation 
infrastructure has been designed technically to reflect these entitlements, and in that 
sense sets physical boundary conditions (notably canal capacities) for water distribution. 
However, the operational rules (cf. Ostrom 1990) for that distribution have emerged, 
over time, in repeated seasonal and yearly cycles of distribution practices, quite 
independently from the formal legal rule set. These rules reproduce patterns of unequal 
water distribution, and co-exist with other canal irrigation „performance problems‟ like 
yield gaps (agricultural productivity below potential) and poor cost recovery (water fee 
collection rates between 2 and 8% (PC/GOI 2013:151) make canal irrigation a heavily 
subsidised sector). 
This situation raises a number of questions relevant to the theme of this special 
 
issue. 
 
1. Why do the legally defined entitlements to canal water for individual 
irrigators not carry more weight in practice? It will be shown that this is not due to lack 
of clarity or fuzziness of their legal status, but to systemic characteristics of Indian 
governance and politics as these have developed post-independence. 
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2. What is the status and degree of institutionalisation of actually existing 
rules for water distribution at different levels of the irrigation system? It will be shown 
that elaborate, institutionalised systems of rules exist at the three system levels of local 
irrigation units, secondary canals and the main canal. This supports Ribot and Peluso‟s 
(2003) argument that in addition to a theory of (property) rights, a theory of access is 
required, because (property) rights do not automatically translate into access, and are 
not the only route towards access. 
3. Is the situation of unequal water distribution and other „performance 
problems‟ in Indian canal irrigation due to the fact that the legal entitlements to water 
have not been defined as individual property rights? That is, could recasting of 
entitlements as (individual) property rights help to enhance the performance of canal 
irrigation – as mainstream economic theory tends to suggest? The answer to this third 
question must be largely conjectural as there is no example in India to test this 
empirically, and extremely few examples in other developing countries‟ canal irrigation 
either. The paper argues that it is highly unlikely that a policy shift towards defining 
water property rights will make a positive contribution to enhancing canal irrigation 
performance. If anything, the contrary is more plausible. 
The broader theoretical issue these findings and  considerations raise is that of 
the appropriate terminology for capturing the complexity and meaning of the 
institutional arrangements in canal irrigation that shape access to water: rights, property, 
entitlements – what analytical and explanatory power do these concepts carry? The 
paper argues that imposing categorical definitions and typologies on specific situations 
is not particularly helpful. The meaning of generic concepts like property, rights, and 
entitlements is contextual. The unravelling of that contextuality is exactly what gives 
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insight into the broader cultural political economy that canal irrigation is part of and that 
it helps to reproduce. Unravelling function beats remaining stuck in form. 
The more detailed discussion of these issues proceeds as follows. Section 2 
discusses property rights arrangements in Indian irrigation and associated strategies for 
water allocation in general. The paper takes the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal (LBC) 
irrigation system in Karnataka, south India, as the main case example, because it 
represents the „clearest‟ form of water entitlement definition.. Section 3 presents the 
actually existing access relations in the Tungabhadra LBC example, outlines the rule 
systems that have emerged in response to the operational inefficacy of formal 
entitlements, and discusses the function and credibility (Ho 2013, 2014) of the rules and 
the social relations in which water distribution is embedded. It also provides reflections 
on the need for a theory of access and the contextuality of law. 
These two sections provide answers to questions 1 and 2 listed above. The third 
question is addressed in section 4. It discusses the purchase of property-rights focused 
economic theory for understanding canal irrigation dynamics. Three critiques are 
elaborated. These address the basic assumption that private property based market can 
effectively perform allocative and efficiency enhancing tasks, the reductionism of (neo- 
institutionalist) economics and other disciplinarily focused explanations, and the 
inherent characteristics of canal irrigation as inhibiting „marketisation‟. Section 5 
concludes with a reflection on the property object status of water in (Indian) canal 
irrigation. 
 
 
 
2. Property rights and allocation in protective irrigation 
 
Colonial construction of large-scale irrigation started mid-19th century, in the Indo- 
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Gangetic plains in the north, and in the deltas in the south (Whitcombe 1972; Stone 
1984; Wallach 1985). It gained further momentum in response to the famines of the 
second part of the 19th century (Famine Commission 1880, 1881, 1898). Public Works 
Departments and Engineering Colleges were established in this period – canal irrigation 
professionalised. The Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission 1901-03 is a 
landmark document as regards the establishment of colonial irrigation policy. By the 
end of the colonial era 13.57 million ha of canal irrigation had been constructed 
(Mollinga 2003, 59; GOI/MOIP 1972, 261). 
The property rights situation with regard to surface water that emerged out of the 
colonial process is one where the state is formally the owner of all surface water 
resources, and the chief allocator of it (Upadhyay 2009; see also Cullet 2009, 40-1). In 
India, river flows are allocated by the state for different uses in yearly quantitative 
volumes, with the allocations having a long-term validity of several decades.3 For 
example, the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system that is the main case 
example of this paper has a yearly allocation of 100 TMCft (thousand million cubic 
feet) under the Krishna river „award‟ (the Tungabhadra being a tributary of Krishna).4 
The (colonial and independent) state‟s assumption of the overall ownership of the 
natural resource water meant that it could assume the role of a developmental state. It 
vested the authority in itself to implement large scale infrastructural works to re-arrange 
 
 
 
3 For example, the 1972 Krishna river award (GOI/KWDT 1973) had a duration of 25 years. As 
revision is a lengthy, because contested, process, which can take decades, allocations 
remain stable for very long periods. The legal process for agreeing and reviewing such 
awards is the 1957 Water Disputes Tribunal Act. 
4 Available water in rivers is calculated based on a „dependable flow‟. For the Krishna river this 
was a 75% dependable flow, meaning that the allocation would on average be physically 
available in three out of four years. 
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the availability of surface water in time and space by the construction of weirs, dams, 
canals and other infrastructure. 5 The landmark document for independent irrigation 
policy is the Report of the Irrigation Commission (GOI/MOIP 1972). Policy focus in 
recent decades has shifted to groundwater irrigation and to urban and industrial water 
supply, as is clearly visible in the recent XIIth Five Year Plan document (PC/GOI 
2013). Nevertheless, budget allocations for large-scale canal irrigation have remained 
relatively stable since 1990 as a percentage of Plan expenditure.6 The present extent of 
Indian large-scale canal irrigation is officially reported as 47.41 million ha (potential 
created) and 35.01 million ha (utilised) at the end on the XIth Plan 2007-2012 (PC/GOI 
2013, 183).7 
Much of the canal irrigation constructed is located in the dry, semi-arid regions 
of India, and always exposed to an erratic monsoon rainfall regime of only a few 
months per year. The Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal exemplifies such a system. It is 
located in north Karnataka, a region with 500-600 mm average, but highly variable, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The authority assumed not only speaks from the power to allocate water, but also from the 
power to acquire land for these construction purposes, that is, to dispossess citizens for the 
benefit of overall development (see the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, recently replaced by 
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act, 2013). 
6 Between 1990 and 2012 Government of India expenditure for major and medium irrigation 
varied between 4.4 and 5.2 % (no trend) of total Plan expenditure. Between 1956 and 1990 
it varied between 6.5 and 9.4 %, the peak being the period 1974-1980 (calculated from 
Annexure 5.1, PC/GOI 2013, 181) 
7 These figures refer to the category „major and medium irrigation‟. Groundwater irrigation area 
stands at 41.82 million ha. 
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rainfall per year. It was a famine region in the colonial period, which was a major 
reason for considering the construction of the irrigation system.8 
Within the bulk, yearly, quantitative allocations that each system receives, water 
for canal irrigation is further allocated to individual water users, or occasionally to 
groups of these. It is even allocated for irrigation of particular pieces of land, during 
particular times (seasons), with particular volumes of water or time-shares of available 
flow. This allocation, and the related distribution, has been designed in regionally 
varying ways. In the semi-arid, relatively water scarce regions of India the colonial 
period produced a threefold regional variation (Wade 1976; Jurriëns and Mollinga 
1996): 
 
(1) the warabandi system in the north (notably present day Haryana, Punjab and 
Uttar Pradesh), 
(2) the block system in the west (notably present day Maharashtra), and 
 
(3) the localisation system (present day Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu). 
 
These allocation systems defined entitlements to irrigation water in different 
ways. The northern warabandi system worked on a time-share basis, allocating 
hours+minutes of available flow per unit area of irrigable land, with farmers free to 
choose their crops (Malhotra 1982; Narain 2003). The western block system attempted 
to introduce measured volumetric supply to groups of farmers cultivating „blocks‟ with 
one-third high water consuming sugarcane as a cash crop, and two-thirds low water 
 
 
 
 
8 On the long drawn, 1860-1940s, negotiation on the decision to construct and the technical 
design of the system, see Mollinga (2003, chapter 4). 
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consuming food and fodder crops (Bolding et al. 1995). The southern localisation 
system was the most strongly prescriptive variant of allocation. It prescribed for each 
irrigable cadastral unit which crop could be grown in which season, and how much 
water was to be supplied for that (Mollinga 2003). 
 
 
The rationing challenge 
 
Common to the three systems is that they involve the demarcation of land that is 
allowed to be irrigated (and thus, simultaneously, land that is excluded from irrigation), 
and allocation of water in relation to the size of the holding, showing the connection of 
water rights/entitlements to land. All three allocation systems have as their main 
characteristic and challenge that they ration water. In the so called protective irrigation 
systems that were constructed in the low rainfall regions, farmers are not entitled for 
irrigation of full crop water requirements (which would maximise the crop‟s yield), but 
they are allocated a part of these full-growth requirements for supplementary irrigation. 
Protective irrigation systems aim to spread water thinly over large areas and numbers of 
farmers, supplying only part of the total water needs of crops. This is in contrast to 
systems that supply full crop water requirements – examples of this being the delta and 
some river systems built in South India in the colonial period for rice cultivation.9 
Protective irrigation, in theory, protects crops against failure, farmers against 
famine/poverty and optimises overall (rather than individual) output (maximising „crop 
per drop‟). 10 
 
 
 
9 For the concepts of protective and productive irrigation, see Mollinga (2003, chapter 3). 
10 For the economics of this, see Mitra (1986), Rath and Mitra (1989) and Dhawan (1988, 
1989). The 1972 Irrigation Commission wrote: “In areas other than those with ample 
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The rationing requirement that characterises protective irrigation, is technically 
expressed in a decision on what the „duty‟ of irrigation is, meaning the number of acres 
that can be irrigated with a unit flow (usually expressed in acres/cusec11). A low duty 
means a lot of water per unit of land; a high duty means less water per unit of land.12 In 
 
protective irrigation, duties are set in such a way that they imply supplementary 
irrigation rather than irrigation to full crop requirements, thus rationing water. In the 
northern warabandi system this was achieved by allocating time shares in combination 
with certain canal flows without prescription of crops. In the western block system and 
southern localisation systems design, quantities of water are combined with the 
prescription of crops (or more precisely, the prohibition of high water consuming crops 
on most of the irrigable land). Localisation is the most detailed and most strongly 
prescriptive of these. The list of cadastral units (called survey numbers in India) with 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
water resources (...) our policy should aim at securing the maximum crop production per 
unit of water. (...) the policy should be to benefit as large a section of the community as 
possible and at the same time enable farmers to obtain reasonable yields. Surface 
irrigation systems should be designed to irrigate compact blocks, the blocks being 
dispersed over a large area to benefit large numbers of farmers. The number of irrigations 
can be fewer than are required for high yields.” (GOI/MOIP 1972, 112-3). 
11 An acre is 0.405 hectare, with a hectare measuring 10,000 m2. A cubic foot is (0.305m)3 or 
0.0283 m3 (and a cusec therefore 28.3 l/sec).The Tungabhadra LBC yearly allocation of 
100 TMCft thus equals 100 x 1000 x 106  x 0.0283 m3, or 2.83 km3. 
12 Duty is the inverse of water allowance, which is usually expressed in liter/second.ha. Water 
allowance is the continuous flow (liter/second) to a unit size of land (hectare) over the 
length of the growing season. High allowance means a lot of water on the plot; low 
allowance means little water on the plot. 
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crop and season specification was published in the State Gazette for the case of the 
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. 13 
Localisation can thus be regarded as the creation of clear and specific 
entitlements to canal irrigation water, specified for land units, seasons and in total 
quantity of water to be received, and with a clear legal status. Under the Karnataka 
Irrigation Act, 1965 two offences were defined: violation of cropping pattern (VCP, 
meaning the growing of unauthorised crops) and unauthorised irrigation (UI, irrigation 
of land outside the prescribed/allowed area or season) (under sections 28(5) and 32(4)). 
Fines were attached to both, which to this day are administered and calculated in long 
lists of survey numbers per village for every irrigation season. Also, canal water release 
schedules are to this day calculated based on the localisation schedule (that is, the 
assumed areas and crops inform the water flows to be released into different canals (and 
originally, in the design and building phase, informed the dimensions of the canals as 
such). 
In all three regions mentioned, the practice of distribution differs substantially 
from the formal rationing schedule. The basic issue is that the logic of the collective 
optimum contradicts the logic of the individual optimum. While rationing water may 
maximise overall production and reduce risk for the largest number of people, and 
increase their livelihood security, for an individual farmer it makes sense to appropriate 
additional water for higher yields in more than one season. The one-season water use of 
an „irrigated dry‟ crop as prescribed in the Tungabhadra LBC localisation scheme, and 
the two seasons of wet rice farming that farmers practice when they get a chance, differ 
 
13 Details of the features of localisation and irrigation system design are discussed in Mollinga 
(2003). The 1956 Localisation Rules under which the Tungabhadra localisation was done 
are reprinted there. 
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in total water use with a factor of four to five. This ratio immediately suggests that in 
case two-season rice cultivation becomes prevalent, the resulting deprivation of other 
entitlement holders will be dramatic, resulting in highly skewed water distribution and 
large parts of the potentially irrigable area not receiving any irrigation water. Such 
appropriation of excess water (as compared to formal entitlement) for two-season rice 
cultivation happened on a large scale in the Tungabhadra system. The region became a 
major rice producing region in Karnataka.14 
 
The resulting skewed distribution is the classical „head-tail‟ pattern of unequal 
water distribution that is found in much canal irrigation, in India as elsewhere, and 
which is central to irrigation policy reform debates. The causes of the unequal 
distribution have been analysed differently, ranging from technical deficiency of the 
infrastructure (leaking canals and deferred maintenance), to locational advantage, to 
more complex institutional and political economy explanations (Chambers 1988; 
Suhardiman and Mollinga 2012). The seemingly chaotic process in which unequal 
water distribution is produced has been characterised by some as a „syndrome of 
anarchy‟ (Hart 1978; Lowdermilk 1990) – implying the absence of a rule-based logic. 
Though unequal distribution in the Tungabhadra LBC is no doubt a dramatic process 
(involving manipulation of outlet gates and canal blockages, guarding of outlets in peak 
 
 
 
14 It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the way this appropriation of irrigation 
water for rice cultivation unfolded from the opening of the main canal in 1953. It was not 
only the result of individual farmer choice, but also of government policy in the early 
decades of the canal‟s existence to use available water for maximum food production, 
India being short of food in the 1960s-1970s. With the reservoir construction completed in 
1953 but the canal system only completed in 1968, there was a long period of high water 
availability as against irrigable land, establishing a logic of allowing intensification for 
maximising food production. 
15 
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season to avoid such manipulation, petitions and lobbying, road blockades, 
demonstrations and sit-ins, and several other things), that drama is structured by, 
sometimes highly sophisticated, rules. Water distribution rules exist at three levels, 
which I discuss in the next section. 
 
 
3. Access relations in the Tungabhadra LBC 
 
In this section I discuss the rules that have been designed, over time, for daily water 
distribution in the Tungabhadra LBC, in response to the inefficacy of the localisation 
schedule. The three levels of rules are those at the level of the local irrigation unit, those 
at the level of the secondary canals (the canals that link the main canal that takes water 
from the Tungabhadra reservoir with the local irrigation units), and those at the level of 
the main canal. The descriptions are brief, for details see Mollinga (2003, chapters 6, 7 
and 9). The description is followed by a presentation of the structure of social relations 
that underpins unequal water distribution. 
 
 
3.1 Farmer designed rotation schedules in local units 
 
Local irrigation units are areas of roughly 50 to 150 acres (20 to 60 hectares) in size, in 
which several tens of farmers have land.  Such a unit receives water from the 
government managed canal system through an „outlet‟, a structure with a pipe that can 
be closed with a steel gate. Government managers have no formal responsibility „below 
the outlet‟; this is the domain where farmers distribute water among themselves, making 
use of field channels that convey water from the outlet structure to individual plots. The 
distribution among (unequally sized) plots takes place in sequence, that is, plots are 
irrigated with the available flow in turns. Irrigation of plots in turns with concentrated 
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flow reduces irrigation time per plot and seepage losses in the field channels as 
compared to a situation where several plots are irrigated simultaneously. The so called 
rotation schedules usually employ the seven day week as the unit of rotation, and 
specify the timing and duration of the irrigation of each plot in that week. Almost 
without exception the allocation of time slots is relative to the size of the plot. For 
example, in a 42 hectares sized local unit, each hectare would be entitled to receive four 
hours of the full flow per week (as a week counts 168 hours). Outlet areas are usually 
divided in zones, and sequences for plot irrigation fixed within these zones. Beyond 
these general principles, rotation schedules vary considerably in their detail across 
different local units. They may or may not include alternation of day and night irrigation 
across weeks, months or seasons, and reversals of plot irrigation sequences. All have 
been designed by farmers in response to the specificities of water scarcity occurrence in 
their unit. One important variation relates to the predictability and size of the flow 
received from the government canal system. In outlet areas whose supply varies 
systematically over the week (say three days with high supply, four days with low 
supply as a result of higher level rotation schedules), the time/ha allocation may be 
different for these two periods. Field research revealed examples of outlet areas with a 
different time/ha allocation for each day of the week, as a fine tuning to varying 
supplies. A common feature of all rule systems was that they functioned as resources 
mobilised when necessary. When water scarcity/demand reaches a level that irrigation 
sequencing can no longer be arranged informally without conflict, the rule system is 
called upon. 
The sophistication and flexibility of outlet area level rule systems for the 
rotation of irrigation, and the seemingly equitable design principle of time/ha, do not 
imply the absence of unequal distribution. In fact, unequal distribution, mostly in a 
17 
This is h  p d sion of an arti l  th ill b  publish d b  Taylo  and Fran is in Jou nal of san  Studi . 
Pl as  f  o th  publish d sion h n itin  ailabl  
h p .tandfonlin .com/loi/fjps .V  
p d V sion do nload d o  SO S R s Onlin  h p prints.soas.ac.u  
 
 
head-tail pattern, was the general observation in the areas and seasons with insufficient 
water for 100% rice cultivation. The basic mechanism explaining this paradox (of 
equity based rules with unequal outcomes) was located in the planting of low-water 
consuming crops by small farmers in anticipation of losing water distribution conflicts 
with large farmers in peak demand periods (for dependency relations between the two 
classes of farmers see below). Water conflicts where thus displaced to crop choice, 
with the more water consuming crops being the more remunerative crops. 
 
 
3.2 Government-elite farmers negotiated rules at secondary canal level 
 
Local irrigation units are situated along secondary canals, in a queue from the upstream 
side, where water enters the secondary canal from the main (or primary) canal, till the 
downstream end, where the secondary canal usually empties in a natural drain. 
Secondary canals are formally managed by the irrigation agency and farmers are 
supposed not to be involved in the delivery of water through local unit outlets. 
However, the secondary canals are a main site of farmer activity „above the outlet‟. A 
key aspect of water access is securing a regular and sufficient supply to one‟s local unit. 
For this purpose local unit groups have organised for „external action‟ in order to secure 
such supply. This involves collection of money (often area-wise) to cover costs for 
lobbying the irrigation agency officials and local politicians, the employment of labour 
to guard outlets along the canal in peak periods of water demand (to control excess 
appropriation upstream and to avoid blocking by downstream farmers of one‟s own 
outlet gate), and to appoint larger, well-placed and capable farmers as outlet 
representatives, for engaging in day-to-day water distribution conflicts along the 
secondary canal as well as for interacting with officials and politicians in their offices 
18 
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and homes. A secondary canal has a length of several to several tens of kilometres, and 
there are thus many outlets competing for water in water scarce periods. In response to 
this, elite farmers and government managers have negotiated rotation schedules over 
local irrigation units, for example by dividing the canal in sections, with each section 
getting preferential supply for specific days of the week. The variation in the detail of 
this is considerable, given very different canal lengths, bifurcation patterns, and the 
spatial distribution of the differential socio-economic power of local units and villages. 
Implementation of the rotation schedules, often formally announced by the irrigation 
agency and printed on pamphlets, and mobilised in peak periods of demand when 
informal mediation no longer works, in principle happens by the irrigation agency staff, 
particularly during the day. At night farmers „implement‟ by manipulating and guarding 
outlet gates. When conflicts escalate, the irrigation agency also undertakes night 
guarding activities by patrolling the canal. The schedules negotiated between the agency 
and the local leadership of elite farmers consolidate a pattern of unequal head to tail 
distribution, in which there is some balance found between efforts to push water as far 
down the canal as possible and local power equations. They are an institutional tool for 
arranging a somewhat predictable water supply schedule in water scarce periods15. 
 
 
3.3 Internal rules in the irrigation agency at main canal level 
 
The main (primary) canal that takes water from the reservoir created by the 
 
 
 
 
15 Fieldwork in 2015 confirmed that these rotation schedules at secondary level continue to be 
in place, with pamphlets printed. However, it was also found that the number of Irrigation 
Department staff posted at canal level has gone down considerably over the preceding 
decade. This may mean that government patrolling and related activities have become less 
frequent and effective over time. 
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Tungabhadra dam to the offtakes of the secondary canals is more than 200 km long, and 
is managed by four irrigation agency divisions, each headed by an Executive Engineer. 
There are in total more than 80 secondary canals drawing water from the main canal, 
forming a very long queue. For rotation schedules to work at secondary level, a regular 
and predictable supply is crucial, and the further downstream one moves along the main 
canal, the more risk and anxiety there is as regards sufficient water reaching the 
particular canal stretch for implementing the expected pattern of (unequal) water 
distribution at secondary level. There is thus a head-tail pattern at main canal level also. 
When too much water is abstracted by upstream secondary canals, farmers from 
downstream secondary canals mount pressure on the officials of their downstream 
division. To manage such pressures, the irrigation agency divisions have produced an 
adapted discharge table for the main canal. The discharge table specifies discharges (in 
m3/sec) and water levels (in meters) at canal division boundaries. Given a particular 
discharge at the dam exit, the corresponding water levels at the head and tail of each 
division can be read off. The official discharge table is calculated on the basis of the 
localisation schedule‟s allocation pattern. This is, however, totally unrealistic in 
practice. In response the irrigation agency has internally designed an adapted, informal 
discharge table in which it has shifted the columns in such a way that more realistic 
corresponding discharges and water levels are given. This informal table serves as the 
institutional instrument for managing internal conflict and external pressure as regards 
water distribution along the main canal. It is largely an irrigation officials affair – 
farmers influence canal management at this level only by lobbying and agitation, and 
efforts at manipulating the gate settings at the entry point of their own secondary canal. 
20 
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3.4.The social relations of unequal water distribution 
 
The rules at these three levels constitute the concretely existing „access relations‟ for 
irrigation water. The rules are „functional‟ in the sense that they are instrumental in 
reproducing a particular pattern of water distribution. This is a highly unequal pattern in 
the Tungabhadra LBC case, hence their repeated (dramatic) contestation every irrigation 
season. In this sense, these rules, which effectively redefine the legal entitlements as 
embodied in the localisation schedule in a spatially and thereby socially skewed pattern, 
are „credible‟. They are actively mobilised by managers and users in conducting water 
distribution.16  The rule systems are coping strategies that reduce the transaction costs of 
 
water distribution, even when their being in a constant state of subversion and 
(re)negotiation makes the rules fragile. Their apparent relative endurance over time 
could be described, following Ho‟s introduction to this issue, as the expression of a 
Progressive Disequilibrium. The endurance of rule systems that reproduce, in this case, 
inequality needs to be understood as the expression of and upheld by a particular power 
balance and social logic, which is summarised in Figure 1. This situation is similar to 
the one described by Ho on the Grazing Ban in China (see this volume).17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Note that in this case the „credibility‟ of the actually existing rule system has no positive 
normative connotations (as the word‟s synonyms like trustworthiness, standing, sincerity 
and believability may suggest). The use of the rule system is pragmatic – many water users 
are still worse off than they should be according to formal rules, and this is a felt injustice. 
17 It can also be noted that the coexistence of a formal, legal allocation plus set of rules, and the 
rules of actually existing access, do not constitute a case of „legal pluralism‟ in the classical 
sense of two rule systems that are alternatively mobilised depending on situations and 
actors at hand. The formal, legal system is rarely called upon (anymore) for solving water 
distribution problems (though reproduced for other reasons), while actually existing access 
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FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Central in Figure 1 are the rich and middle peasants. They are the main 
appropriators of excess water, that is, intensive rice cultivators.18 I have called them 
elite farmers above because they are also local leaders, for instance at the head of 
formal Water Users Associations (WUAs) and, practically more important, of informal 
farmer groups and networks, which lobby the irrigation agency for securing access to 
water. In the local expression these are the farmers that are „economically and 
politically sound‟.  When irrigation water access becomes problematic in peak demand 
periods, these farmers would exert pressure on the irrigation department officials (the 
formally responsible managers of the system), through a series of means, which 
sometimes results in (extra) water being supplied. When this does not yield sufficient 
result, the elite farmers use an indirect route to exert this pressure via the elected 
member of parliament of their constituency. In India‟s constituency based democracy, 
elected rural politicians depend on the local elites that control the „vote banks‟ in their 
constituency. Elite farmers exchange electoral support against the politician‟s influence 
on the irrigation department as regards the provision of irrigation water. Politicians have 
such influence because they control the „market for public office‟, as seminally 
 
 
 
relations are the dominant rule system, co-designed by government managers, irrigators 
and politicians. 
18 This connection is partly recursive: farmers who happen to be in a location that allows 
excess appropriation of water can become rich and middle peasants over time because 
their relatively high income allows them to expand their holdings. However, already 
large/affluent farmers have also acquired land in favourable locations. On the water 
distribution related land market, and the phenomenon of land lease and purchase by in- 
migrating (rice) farmers, see Mollinga (2003, chapter 5). 
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described in Wade‟s (1982, 1985) analysis of the system of administrative and political 
corruption. Indian government officials are regularly transferred, and for securing or 
avoiding certain transfers, or sometimes for staying in position, government officials 
need to make payments to politicians. They source the funds for these payments 
primarily from the budget for the physical works (maintenance and construction) for the 
irrigation system they work in. The third set of relations that the elite farmers maintain 
are with the small and poor peasants in their area. Elite farmers also are major 
employers of local labour, and frequently act as local moneylenders, thus creating 
dependency relations with the group of small and poor peasants. These small and poor 
peasants have some limited leverage in this relationship as voters being mobilised as 
part of an elite „vote bank‟. To reproduce the political support that elite farmers require 
for the exertion of their leadership, they, among other things, share a part of the 
excess/extra water they secure with small and poor peasants.19 The agency of small and 
poor peasants depends, apart from the features of labour and credit markets, on 
competition between different elite sections; the irrigation department officials‟ room to 
manoeuvre similarly consist in the fact that there are a series of local elites located on 
different sections along the canal that are competing for water. The simplified structure 
presented here does thus not produce simple, linear social processes and outcomes, but 
structures a highly dynamic process of contestation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 This is one point at which the equity dimension of localisation is frequently discursively 
mobilised by elite farmers towards government officials and elected politicians. For a 
broader analysis of the populism of India‟s 1970s and 1980s „new farmers movements‟, 
see Brass (1995); for Karnataka specifically see Nadkarni (1987). 
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3.5 The role of water rights in unequal distribution in the Tungabhadra LBC 
 
Based on this description of actually existing water distribution practices in the 
Tungabhadra LBC case, I offer two reflections that qualify the contribution of property 
rights analysis to the understanding of unequal water distribution. 
A first reflection regards the rights and access notions. The presentation in the 
previous section shows that farmers‟ water use is shaped by a set of access relations in 
the forms of rules at different canal levels. These rules have no direct connection with 
the entitlements as defined in the localisation schedule. In fact, they have emerged over 
time as a response to the impossibility to implement localisation‟s allocation pattern. 
Localisation practically only exists as a normative principle, not as an operational tool. 
This situation confirms Ribot and Peluso‟s (2003) argument, for local natural resource 
use more generally, that apart from a theory of rights, a theory of access is required. The 
centrality of rules crafted „in process‟ plus the practical irrelevance of formally defined 
entitlements, illustrates, strongly, their point that distribution cannot be „read off‟ 
property rights, and that access relations need to be analysed in their own right. Thus, 
even when property rights would matter, they would not be the only thing that mattered 
given that „access‟ needs to be looked at separately. 
A second qualification of the purchase of property rights based analysis relates 
to the contextuality of rights.  In the case study discussion above I have carefully 
avoided the „rights‟ word and spoken as much as possible about „entitlements‟ instead, 
notwithstanding the legal status of these entitlements. There has been a period in which 
the localisation-defined entitlements for Tungabhadra LBC farmers were actively 
treated as rights by irrigators, notably by those who could not realise their entitlement to 
water. In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds, if not thousands, of writ petitions were 
registered at the High Court of Karnataka submitted by farmers who did not receive 
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water as per the localisation schedule, with reference to the clauses in the Irrigation Act 
mentioned above.20 At policy level, discussion on a „law and order‟ approach to the 
implementation of localisation continued till well into the 1970s (GOMYS/DOA 1968; 
GOKAR/PD 1976; CADA/TBP 1979). By the late 1980s, however, „tailenders‟ had lost 
their confidence in legal action as a feasible strategy for securing access to water, that 
is, no longer considered their entitlement as an enforceable right. 
In Indian canal irrigation policy and academic discourse, entitlements to 
irrigation water are not generally referred to as „water rights‟, notwithstanding their 
legal anchoring. These entitlements are treated more as allocations prescribed and to be 
implemented by the state administration rather than as (enforceable) rights of individual 
farmers. Government, after all, has claimed the overall ownership of water, to be used 
in the public interest. This reflects the developmental state‟s ambition of the first 
decades after independence, but Upadhyay (2009) also proposes a deeper dimension of 
this. In the context of a conflict about water stored behind the Hirakud dam in the state 
of Orissa, which the government (being the owner of the dam and the water), sought to 
partially re-allocate to industry and where farmers claimed that the waters really belong 
to „the people of western Orissa‟, he states the following. 
 
„If questions in law and jurisprudence are never seriously raised in popular 
movements and protests, they are equally (if not more so) ignored by the 
governments of the day. This is perhaps because raising the ownership question 
and investigating the state rights vis-à-vis the rights of the people in water means 
questioning entrenched beliefs, vested interests and altering power equations. This 
understanding strengthens the tendency of not invoking such questions or 
addressing them head on.‟ (ibid., 143) 
 
 
 
20 This was documented in fieldwork in 1991-92, when I looked up registered cases at the High 
Court and interviewed advocates involved in such cases (see Mollinga 2003, 72-75). 
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In the footnote attached to this section he further states: 
 
 
„The author feels that the ownership question in water has never been seriously 
addressed by policymakers and jurists despite the continuing claims and counter- 
claims on the part of the State and the people.‟ (ibid., fn. 22, 143) 
 
Though formal water law is clear about the state‟s claim of ownership and 
control, this claim is only partly felt to be legitimate by the people (irrigated farmers in 
the case example). This can be understood as an instance of the long-standing 
problematic relationship of Indian states with the populace in terms of legitimacy and 
accountability, including the independent democratic state. Kaviraj (1997) argues that 
the Western form of political democracy that India adopted after independence was an 
elite project implanted on Indian society „from the top‟, which „meant that a problem of 
intelligibility of the political institutions of the state remained at the heart of the Indian 
democratic system‟ (ibid., 232). A structure has been reproduced in which the state is 
exterior to local social dynamics, and is seen as a whimsical tyrant with which one enters into 
relations of patronage and which one tries to control or influence in part for one‟s own benefit, 
but never considers as one‟s own (for more discussion, see Mollinga 2010). Entitlements are 
treated as privileges accorded by government rather than as rights of those entitled. 
Clear and unambiguous legal text cannot resolve this situation. To the contrary, 
this situation to an important extent annuls the force of law, while tending to produce a 
highly polarised form of (water) politics (Mollinga 2010). Property rights, even when 
clearly defined and legally enshrined, have no force by themselves: the force of legal 
concepts and definitions is always contextual.  While at some point farmers believed 
that the localisation-based entitlements provided strong legal claims, and government 
pursued, or at least seriously discussed, a law and order approach to its implementation, 
this faith and conviction has disappeared in the realities of India‟s competitive populist 
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politics and actually existing relations between the administrative and political arms of 
the state, as summarised in Figure 1.21 
These two points, the independent status of access relations and the 
contextuality of law, already provide good reasons to be sceptical about explanations of 
unequal water distribution and other „performance problems‟ of canal irrigation that 
start from an economic theory-based primacy of property rights. The next section takes 
a more detailed look at economic theory-inspired discussion of canal irrigation (reform) 
in India and elsewhere. 
 
 
4. Economic theory and canal irrigation (reform) 
 
This section discusses whether or not the strengthening of the (individual private) 
property status of water might be instrumental in addressing the „performance 
problems‟ of canal irrigation. 
 
 
4.1 ‘Marketisation’ inspired canal irrigation reform 
The post-1990 period is not the first time that Indian canal irrigation has seen attempts 
to introduce (neo)liberal logics in its management. For the colonial period attempts at 
volumetric supply and contractual water delivery in north India have been reported by 
Stone (1984, 180-3). They were abandoned in 1870. The mid-19th century saw an 
attempt at private irrigation investment through the Madras Irrigation and Canal 
 
 
 
21 The equity dimension of localisation continues to be mobilised discursively in the political 
sphere, the localisation schedule continues to be used to calculate formal canal release 
schedules at the start of the irrigation seasons, and administrative documentation of its 
violation is routinely produced. Localisation thus primarily has symbolic purchase – 
arguably of declining strength. 
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Company (MICC) (Atchi Reddy 1990), which ended with the Crown taking over the 
company. Early 20th century saw a concerted attempt in the Bombay Presidency, present 
Maharashtra, which failed to establish the volumetric pricing of water (Bolding et al. 
1995). 
 
 
Since the early 1990s, a decade sometimes described as the age of „market 
triumphalism‟ (Peet and Watts 1993), there has been a new surge of advocacy of 
„marketisation‟22  of/in canal irrigation. Globally, the strongest version of this 
 
perspective was an argument for the introduction of „tradable water rights‟ to solve both 
allocation and efficiency problems in water resources management, including canal 
irrigation (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994). This is a perspective that posits the need 
for clear and unencumbered private property in water, to allow market mechanisms to 
do their optimisation work: allocation of water to the use with highest economic 
benefits, and the constitution of incentives for efficient water use. However, there is 
only one southern country in which this discourse was taken to its full practical 
conclusion, namely Chile. In Chile, allocative and use efficiency did not result from the 
introduction of tradable water rights, as has been documented by Bauer (1997, 2004, 
2015). Efforts to expand the Chilean approach to other countries in Latin America met 
with great resistance, with the emblematic Cochabamba „water war‟ as the best known 
example (Nickson and Vargas 2002). 
This strong articulation of „tradable water rights‟ has not made it to discursive 
and policy prominence in Indian canal irrigation. However, a general sense of the 
 
22 I use the term „marketisation‟ to (loosely) refer to the variety of approaches to canal 
irrigation reform that find their inspiration in economic theories focusing on the positive 
allocative and efficiency work that private property based markets and market(-like) 
mechanisms can do. 
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desirability of „more market‟ in irrigation is present in Indian irrigation academic and 
policy writing. The clearest exponent of this is perhaps Saleth (1996) – a resource 
economist then based at the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi. He claims that “[t]he 
economic rationality and urgency for a water institution based on a legally-based and 
farmer-managed water rights system are indeed very clear and compelling” (p.271) and 
argues that the “institutional significance of the rights system for sustainable 
development emerges from the fact that it is one of those rare policy instruments that 
can simultaneously address three critical goals of sustainable development, i.e., 
ecological security, economic efficiency, and social equity” (p.272-3). This is based on 
the premise that “[t]he present institutions governing water use do not allow the 
emergence of a mechanism to effectively capture and transmit either the scarcity value 
or the use value of water to the farmers” (p.235) and that “[i]n order for the water rights 
system to perform its economic function (…) [f]irst, water rights should be defined on a 
private basis. And, second, they should transferable, or, at least amenable to a rental 
system.” (p.243) In policy-related writing similar thinking is found, though usually less 
focused on „water rights‟ as such, but on the introduction of market(-like) mechanisms 
and private sector participation more broadly, and often with a call on international 
experience (cf. Mohanty and Gupta 2002; Shah et al. 2004).23 
India has seen only weak translations of such mainstream economics inspired 
discourse into canal irrigation reform policy.  The post 1990 attempts at Participatory 
 
 
 
23 The 2030 Water Resources Group (WRG), established by the IFC (International Finance 
Corporation ) in partnership with the World Economic Forum, private companies and 
development agencies, is a global carrier of this discourse that is also active in India (see 
2030 Water Resources Group 2012). 
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Irrigation Management (PIM) are only a half-hearted attempt at the introduction of 
water pricing, and mainly focus on organising water users into associations, and 
rehabilitating canal infrastructure.24 Partly as a result of global discourse and policy 
leverage, some Indian government Irrigation Departments have been recast as 
companies (Nigams), Karnataka and Gujarat being two examples. However, these 
continue to function as government agencies in practice, and are far removed from the 
concept of „self-financing irrigation bureaucracies‟ (Merrey, 1996), that is, irrigation 
bureaucracies functioning like corporate entities having to balance their budgets, 
notably through fee collection from water users. 
Times may be changing, however, also in this respect. A recent development in 
Indian irrigation policy is a shift towards the introduction of regulatory authorities for 
the water sector, as part of broader liberalisation policy, and following such introduction 
in the electricity sector. The state of Maharashtra has advanced furthest in this regard 
through the creation and functioning of the Maharashtra Water Resources Regulatory 
Authority (MWRRA). The approach is being expanded to the national scale. Part of the 
MWRRA mandate is to define individual water rights, also for agricultural water use. 
This explicit use of the „water right‟ notion is a novelty in the Indian context. (Wagle et 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Interestingly, the global policy concept of IMT (Irrigation Management Transfer) (cf. 
Vermillion, 1997), which has a much stronger „marketisation‟ emphasis than PIM 
(Participatory Irrigation Management), has not gained currency in Indian irrigation 
scholarship and policy discourse, except in some globally funded research efforts (Brewer et 
al. 1999). The most thoughtful and balanced statement on issues of pricing in India irrigation 
remains Vaidyanathan (1992). 
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al. 2012; Warghade and Wagle 2013). The actual definition of individual water rights 
for agricultural water use does, however, not seem to have started so far. 
A more concrete form of policy change is renewed interest in the 
commodification of canal irrigation.25 This does not express primarily through „water‟ 
as an object of commodification, but in increasing private sector involvement in the 
deployment of „modern‟ water delivery technology, notably micro-irrigation (drip, 
sprinkler). This comprises kits for individual farmers, but also the construction of new 
micro-irrigation based irrigation systems, and units within systems, by private 
companies. This is combined with (ideas of) agribusiness forms of cash crop cultivation 
(vegetables, sugarcane) and marketing.26  Not very much exists on the ground so far, and 
what exists seems to experience considerable operational problems, but there clearly is a 
strong government-supported thrust in this direction.27 
 
Notwithstanding little „marketisation‟ practice in Indian canal irrigation , it is 
relevant to critique the reasoning underpinning market/private property inspired 
irrigation reform thinking as that discourse remains present and is gaining prominence 
in policy debates. These policy debates are not only ideologically inspired, but also 
address concrete challenges in and for canal irrigation, notably 1) the continuingly acute 
 
 
 
25  This paragraph is based on fieldwork in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat in 2015. 
26 Cf. the brochure Proposed Scheme. Drip Irrigation for Sugarcane in Karnataka. A 
revolutionary initiative published by the Government of Karnataka, Department of Water 
Resources, Major and Medium Irrigation (n.d.). 
27 The Gujarat Green Revolution Company (GGRC) established by the Government of Gujarat 
to promote micro-irrigation, among other things, is an example (www.ggrc.co.in). 
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„performance problems‟ in canal irrigated agriculture, and 2) the increasing pressure to 
allocate water „out of agriculture‟ for urban and industrial use. 
 
 
4.2 Critique of market and private property focused thinking on canal irrigation 
 
This subsection critiques market/private property inspired thinking on canal irrigation 
(reform). In general, three types of critique of market/private property inspired thinking 
on canal irrigation (reform) can be distinguished. Two of these are of general nature, not 
specific for but applicable to canal irrigation. 
 
(1) The economic theory underlying „marketisation‟ oriented thinking is 
fundamentally flawed: private property based markets cannot do the allocative 
and efficiency work that economic theory wants it to do. 
(2) The neo-institutionalist economics perspective, like other disciplinary 
perspectives, is reductionist: as a partial, one-dimensional perspective it fails to 
capture the causal complexity of irrigation situations; the implicitly or explicitly 
claimed primacy of a single causal factor is unhelpful for both analysis and 
design of realistic reform approaches. 
The first two points I treat briefly as the arguments supporting them are well known in 
the critical literature on markets and neoliberalism. The third critique addresses the 
specificity of canal irrigation, is perhaps less well known, and I discuss it in some more 
detail. 
(3) Canal irrigation does not allow private property/market based arrangements to 
work (well) because of the specific technical and institutional features of canal 
irrigation systems and their management. 
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First and second critique: how markets really work 
 
Mainstream economics is seen by its critics to have an idealised view of how markets 
and the private property arrangements that underpin them (could) work (cf. Mackintosh 
1990, White 1993). In such critiques markets and property (and related phenomena like 
prices) are regarded as specific instances of the generic notion of institutions, and as 
relational objects, expressing and representing specific configurations of social relations 
of power. Examples include  Granovetter‟s analysis of the „embedded‟ nature of 
markets (Granovetter 1985), and for property rights specifically the notion that natural 
resource rights are „bundles of rights‟, as developed in theories of legal pluralism 
(Benda Beckmann and van der Velde 1992), and, as already discussed above, the 
insight that to capture resource management dynamics a theory of access is required in 
addition to a theory of rights (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
A specific variant of this kind of insight/critique in the Indian context is the 
analysis of „interlocked markets‟ showing how different types of market transactions are 
linked, producing power effects (Sarap 1991). Debate on groundwater access is largely 
about the existence of such interlockedness and its effects (see Prakash (2005) on the 
relationship between sharecropping and access to water in Gujarat). In the Tungabhadra 
LBC case the explanation of unequal water distribution also has a strong element of 
interlocking: local water distribution is interlocked with credit and labour markets, 
system level water distribution is interlocked with the market for public office. The 
specific form of these linkages helps to explain (unequal) outcomes. 
What such „fundamental‟ critiques of mainstream economics‟ understanding of 
market, property and price have given us is a conceptual apparatus for a much more 
refined understanding of how the institutions of property, market and price „really 
work‟, in a relational, multidimensional, embedded and evolutionary way. 
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Third critique: water as an „uncooperative commodity‟ 
 
The third critique argues that the „resilience‟ of canal irrigation management practices 
to „marketisation‟, partly lies in the specific material and institutional characteristics of 
large-scale canal irrigation systems and the water that flows through them. In the 
context of urban water supply, Bakker (2003) has characterised water as „an 
uncooperative commodity‟. This characterisation can also be applied to canal irrigation. 
Credit goes to Moore (1989) for providing the first detailed argument on this, before the 
 
„marketisation‟ hype of the early 1990s. He argues that “it is rarely practicable to apply 
scarcity pricing rigorously because of the economic and technical infeasibility of 
volumetric water pricing in most Third World irrigation schemes.” (ibid., 1733) 
 
„The reasons for the infeasibility of volumetric water pricing lie in the interaction 
of a number of physical and economic characteristics of water and of LSGFISs 
[large scale gravity flow irrigation systems]. (…) water is an unusually mobile 
physical commodity. It has a high predisposition to flow, to seep vertically and 
horizontally through soils, to evaporate and transpire. On surface irrigation systems 
one has also to consider the way in which rainfall adds to aggregate supplies in a 
variable and unpredictable fashion and the correspondingly unpredictable losses 
(…) Domestic water and electricity supply systems are (…) very misleading 
models for LSGFISs. (…) „ (ibid., 1738) 
 
Both demand and supply of water have a considerable degree of variability and 
unpredictability for reasons beyond the control of managers and users. Furthermore, 
given the size and fluid nature of water it is practically very difficult to accurately police 
water distribution in large scale irrigation even under the best of institutional 
circumstances. Though irrigation systems can in theory be made to function like piped 
water supply systems in which each individual user can independently open the tap and 
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pay for volume used, this is practically almost unimaginable for a large-scale canal 
irrigation system populated with many tens of thousands of smallholders, and 
economically prohibitive, that is too expensive. Even when this could/would be realised 
at the level of groups of farmers taking water from a single „tap‟ at will, this would still 
not amount to the existence of a „water market‟. A model in which farmers can purchase 
water from different providers using the same supply grid (as in electricity privatisation) 
is highly unrealistic. The basin-level interconnectedness of water cycles and flows 
subverts any model in which there are independent private suppliers/producers of water 
catering to a set of customers. Given these challenges, even water pricing (without a 
water market) is difficult to implement as it requires a strong managerial framework for 
delivery and for monitoring – the weakness of which is precisely the reason to introduce 
pricing and markets in the mainstream economic perspective! Molle and Berkoff‟s 
(2007) review of the practices of water pricing confirms that there are virtually no 
examples in canal irrigation where prices and markets do the work that mainstream 
economic theory wants them to do. To conclude, the specific material and institutional 
features of canal irrigation make the „marketisation‟ of water management and 
governance a challenge.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 This „uncooperative commodity‟ argument should not be essentialised. For example, in 
England and Wales efforts are ongoing to push further the incomplete process of 
marketization of urban water supply, which has been argued to have stalled because of the 
„uncooperative‟ nature of water, through new interventions in the institutional context (cf. 
Walker 2014). The point is that a lot of „embedding‟ work may be required to make markets 
work  more as envisaged in theory. The feasibility of such efforts depends on characteristics 
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5. Conclusion: beyond property rights in water 
 
The discussion above has shown that there is no lack of clarity in the formal definition 
of property rights in land, state ownership of water, and irrigators‟ legal entitlements to 
water in Indian canal irrigation, as illustrated by the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal 
south Indian irrigation system. Farmers‟ private property rights in land are not disputed; 
the state‟s overall ownership of water resources is legally clear, and as far as water 
management within canal irrigation systems  is concerned, not contested29; the water 
 
entitlements of individual farmers are legally and clearly enshrined in the localisation 
schedule. It is thus difficult to argue that insecurity in property rights lies at the basis of 
the „performance problems‟ of south Indian, and by implication other, canal irrigation 
systems. The discussion above vindicates Ribot and Peluso‟s argument that in addition 
to a theory of property, a theory of access is required. At the same time, it also 
demonstrates the problem of the neo-liberal focus on institutional form instead of 
function. The institutional dimension of system performance is about the intricacies of 
access relations rather than property relations. Secondly, it has been shown that law (in 
this case, legal definitions of entitlements) is only as forceful as the context allows it to 
be, and that „clarity‟ does not constitute force by itself. In addition it has been shown 
that notions like property, market and price have to be „pluralised‟: their multiple 
dimensions need to be considered, in contrast to the more singular understanding of 
 
 
 
of both the existing cultural political economy and the resources management system, 
neither of which is, however, immutable.. 
29 The Indian state‟s ownership claim on water resources has been increasingly contested in 
past decades in the case of new diversions. 
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these concepts in mainstream economic (and, for that matter, in quite a bit of heterodox 
political economy) theory. Such conceptual extension yields a vocabulary that allows a 
richer and more refined analysis of the social relations of irrigation water management, 
as illustrated with the case example. Another addition has been that a consideration of 
the specific material and institutional features of canal irrigation matter for the type of 
institutional arrangements for water distribution that are possible – causing significant 
constraints to „marketisation‟. 
It is also not easy to see how a strengthening of the legal status of individual 
water entitlements to explicit water rights might do much to make water distribution less 
unequal. Given the weakness of the legal and administrative enforcement system, the 
contrary is more easily imaginable. For instance, when entitlements would become 
tradable use rights, a further accumulation of water could possibly ensue through the 
same interlocked dependencies of water distribution with credit and employment that 
were described above. In a positive interpretation such tradable use rights might, in 
contrast, become a mechanism for tail-enders to receive at least some compensation for 
the excess upstream appropriation. However, the same systemic weakness would 
militate against the effective making of payment claims. I conclude that upsetting the 
function and credibility of existing rules systems, no matter how pragmatic they may be, 
and notwithstanding their role in the reproduction of unequal distribution, should be 
treated with care as institutions arise in an endogenous manner. This is why the 
intentional design of institutions as propagated in the neo-liberal paradigm should be 
viewed with suspicion. Changes in the formal property status of water alone are unlikely 
to affect existing access patterns in canal irrigation, unless accompanied by, or pa          
rt of, changes of power balances in the governance and management structure of     
canal irrigation. 
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Figure 1: The social relations of unequal water distribution in the Tungabhadra Left 
Bank Canal (Mollinga 2003, 360) 
